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 FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE AND 
POLITICAL POWER: 
A PERSONAL REFLECTION ON 
TWENTY YEARS IN THE 
TRENCHES 
Alan Young* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two decades have passed since the historic proclamation of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms1 and the obvious question to be posed is whether this 
historic event has truly had a significant impact on the balance of political 
power in this country. For some, the enshrinement of constitutional constraints 
on state power was never viewed as a crowning achievement, but rather as an 
impermissible shift of political power to a branch of government without elec-
toral accountability. In the world of political theory reasonable people will 
continue to debate the question of the legitimate boundaries between legislative 
and judicial power, but as a practical matter, there can be little doubt that the 
proclamation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has had the potential to 
infuse a great deal more political content into the traditional adjudicative proc-
ess. This brief paper will explore the extent to which the Charter has shifted the 
balance of power in the realm of criminal justice policy, and more specifically, 
whether the Charter has diminished the authority and jurisdiction of the federal 
government to rely upon the criminal law power to address perceived social 
problems. 
Perhaps the most fertile ground for examining contemporary shifts in politi-
cal power would be found in the equality provisions of the Charter; however, 
this paper will only discuss the impact of the principles of fundamental justice 
on the development of criminal justice policy. The vague contours of the right 
expressed in section 7 of the Charter are an invitation for judicial innovation, 
and there is little doubt that in terms of procedural justice, section 7 has had a 
significant impact upon the administration of criminal justice. In 20 years, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has amassed an impressive body of jurisprudence 
which has had a clear impact upon the exercise of prosecutorial and investiga-
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tive powers, but the extent and nature of this impact has yet to be fully chroni-
cled and analyzed. This brief paper will not focus upon the procedural content 
of section 7 but rather upon the substantive component of the principles of 
fundamental justice. To truly determine whether the Charter has effected a shift 
in political power, it is more instructive to examine whether there is a coherent 
body of substantive principles of fundamental justice which constrains the 
power of the federal Parliament to enact criminal law. Procedure and form have 
always been the lifeblood of the common law, so one would expect the judici-
ary to approach procedural issues with some degree of confidence and audacity; 
however, judicial review of public policy and the merits of criminal legislation 
has never fit comfortably within the parameters of traditional judicial power.  
The question posed herein is whether section 7 of the Charter provides a 
mechanism for judicial review of patently stupid laws. Suppose Parliament was 
to enact a law providing that all residents must exit public buildings by walking 
backwards in a slow shuffle with the failure to do so being punished by a sum-
mary conviction offence. Is it a breach of the principles of fundamental justice 
to enact criminal laws which clearly do not serve the public interest, or is this 
purely a question of policy best left to elected officials? Does section 7 of the 
Charter have a role to play when it appears that there is no constructive purpose 
behind a legislative enactment? We may never be required to assess the consti-
tutionality of a law as ridiculous as the “walking backwards” legislation, but 
there is a small collection of criminal offences which cries out for justification 
and legitimation. For decades, commentators have cast doubt on the legitimacy 
of criminalizing “consensual crimes”,2 and I have come to agree with the vast 
majority of commentators who assert that the criminalization of consensual 
activity is a foolish and ill-informed policy which unjustifiably restricts liberty. 
Although the line between law and politics may be far more blurry than we care 
to admit, it does not necessarily follow that section 7 of the Charter readily 
embraces judicial review of the merits of parliamentary policy choices. So for 
me, the intriguing question became whether or not the mounting political objec-
tions to the criminalization of consensual activity could be repackaged into a 
justiciable, constitutional objection.  
To answer that question, I embarked upon a number of challenges to the 
constitutional authority of Parliament to transform perceived social problems 
into criminal prohibitions. In the early 1990s I brought constitutional challenges 
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to the “consensual” crimes relating to obscenity and gambling to no avail,3 but 
in the late 1990s, I appeared to discover a crack in the wall in relation to the 
criminalization of marijuana possession. In challenging this prohibition, an 
extensive trial record was produced to demonstrate that marijuana consumption 
is “relatively harmless”, that marijuana is a benign substance and that the 
criminalization of marijuana has had deleterious social impact. The question 
posed for the Court was whether it violates the principles of fundamental jus-
tice to criminalize a relatively harmless activity. From a lay point of view, the 
question still remains whether or not the judiciary can invalidate a “stupid” law, 
but through the lens of constitutional law the question becomes whether or not 
the principles of fundamental justice include a “harm principle” which prevents 
Parliament from relying upon the criminal sanction unless it has a “reasonable 
apprehension” of significant harm associated with the impugned activity. In the 
fall of 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada will have to directly confront this 
issue in three related cases,4 and in light of the fact that the Supreme Court has 
yet to hear argument in this case, I will refrain from commenting directly on the 
merits of the challenge to the constitutional propriety of criminalizing the con-
sensual crime of possession of cannabis sativa; however, I will outline the 
jurisprudential foundation for my assertion that section 7 of the Charter inexo-
rably leads a court down the path of reviewing the merits of public policy. This 
can be masked or hidden, but it cannot be avoided. Section 7 does contain the 
seeds for a monumental shift in political power, but it is unclear whether or not 
the judicial branch of government is willing to realize this potential.  
II.  THE POLITICS OF FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
The strength and power of section 7 is contingent upon two variables — the 
interpretation of the terms, “life, liberty and security”, and the elucidation of the 
content of the principles of fundamental justice. The threshold issue of “life, 
liberty and security” serves as a gatekeeper to decide what types of claims of 
“deprivation” will warrant judicial review. The review under section 7 is to 
determine if the deprivation is in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice. The gatekeeper issue is an important component in the assessment of 
the impact of section 7, but in a paper of this brevity I have chosen to focus on 
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(Ont. C.A.); R. v. Caine; R. v. Malmo-Levine, [1998] B.C.J. No. 885 (Prov. Ct.); online: QL 
(B.J.C.); affd (2000), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (B.C.C.A.). 
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the more elusive question of what constitutes a principle of fundamental justice. 
Specifically, this paper concerns the operation of these fundamental principles 
in the context of criminal law, and criminal law by definition will always entail 
a deprivation of liberty. As such, any provision of the criminal law has to oper-
ate in a manner which is consistent with principles of fundamental justice.  
Will the review of criminal legislation for consistency with ill-defined prin-
ciples of fundamental justice shift the balance of power in favor of the judici-
ary? It is hard to tell. At times the Supreme Court of Canada takes an active 
lawmaking role as evidenced by the elaborate and detailed guidelines created 
by the Court for assessing when state conduct constitutes entrapment.5 At other 
times the Court shies away from entering the political arena. Earlier this year 
the Court’s only response to the important question of the proper relationship 
between police and prosecutor was, “while the police tasks of investigation and 
charge-laying must remain distinct and independent from the Crown role of 
prosecution, I do not think it is the role of this Court to make a pronouncement 
on the details of the practice of how that separation must be maintained”.6 It is 
sometimes difficult to ascertain if the Court has a consistent understanding of 
its role in the post-Charter era. 
Much of the confusion emanates from the fact that there still remains many 
principled objections to the spectre of the judiciary appropriating to itself legis-
lative powers. Concern about judicial capacity for setting public policy and 
implementing rules commonly revolves around one or more of the following 
assertions: 
1. Courts do not set their decision-making agenda. The issues raised for their 
consideration are restricted by the fortuities of litigation. The litigants are re-
sponsible for setting the agenda, and the issues raised may be distorted by the 
motives and resources of the litigants. 
2. Adjudication is focussed and incremental. Judges are called upon to de-
cide legal entitlement by determining which party has a legal right and which 
party has a legal duty. This process is distinct from that of a legislative planner 
who must ask, “what are the alternatives?” The responsibility to resolve the 
particular dispute handicaps the court in gaining a perspective on the broad 
contextual setting of the issues. 
3. Judges are generalists, and they lack sufficient specialized expertise to 
master the intricacies of various policy problems. 
4. The fact-finding process of adjudication makes it ill-suited for ascertain-
ing relevant social facts. The evidentiary rules of admissibility place artificial 
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6
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(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)  Fundamental Justice and Political Power 125 
 
constraints on a judge’s ability to receive information that may be vital for the 
development of policy yet irrelevant for the disposition of the particular case. 
5. Courts lack the power to enforce compliance with their decrees. In addi-
tion, the adjudicative process is not equipped for the monitoring of the policy 
implications of any decision.7 
There are still many judges who are reluctant to accept a potential shift in 
political power. In 1982, Scollin J. warned us against the “sophisticated protec-
tive cocoon spun by a civil libertarian zealot”,8 and in 1996 McClung J.A. 
bemoaned the “spectre of constitutionally hyperactive judges . . . pronouncing 
all of our emerging rights . . . according to their own values”.9 However, from 
the outset it appeared clear that the Supreme Court of Canada was ready, will-
ing and able to set sail in uncharted, constitutional waters. Three early pro-
nouncements under the Charter showed that the Court understood that 
constitutional adjudication had taken on an increased political dimension.  
In 1984, the Court had its first opportunity to explore the interplay of consti-
tutional norms in relation to the investigative process. Hunter v. Southam Inc. 
will be remembered for establishing the minimum requirements for a constitu-
tionally valid search, but from my perspective, the importance of the case lies 
in a subtle point which is often overlooked. Chief Justice Dickson noted: 
I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a 
purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of 
reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to con-
strain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in 
itself an authorization for governmental action. . . . It does not in itself confer any 
powers, even of “reasonable” search and seizure, on these governments.10 
Of course, this is an obvious point, but it also underscores a more important 
proposition concerning constitutional rights. The Court fully understands that 
the Charter does not expand state power. Constitutions are designed to be anti-
government documents predicated on a healthy dose of mistrust of public offi-
cials and a fear of tyranny of the majority. Perhaps the Court did not directly 
express this sentiment, but the realization that the Charter can only serve to 
diminish, and not expand, legislative power is an important first step in accept-
ing that the Charter mandates a shift in the existing political power structures.  
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In 1985, in the context of reviewing defence policy, the Court recognized 
that casting an issue as a “political question” would not bar a court from exer-
cising review under the Charter. Ultimately, the Court did not review the con-
stitutionality of proposed cruise missile testing in Canada, but Wilson J. laid to 
rest the notion that political questions and constitutional questions are not 
mutually exclusive categories: 
Because the effect of the appellants’ action is to challenge the wisdom of the gov-
ernment’s defence policy, it is tempting to say that the Court should in the same 
way refuse to involve itself. However, I think this would be to miss the point, to fail 
to focus on the question which is before us. The question before us is not whether 
the government’s defence policy is sound but whether or not it violates the appel-
lants’ rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is a totally dif-
ferent question. I do not think there can be any doubt that this is a question for the 
courts. Indeed, s. 24(1) of the Charter, also part of the Constitution, makes it clear 
that the adjudication of that question is the responsibility of “a court of competent 
jurisdiction”. While the court is entitled to grant such remedy as it “considers ap-
propriate and just in the circumstances”, I do not think it is open to it to relinquish 
its jurisdiction either on the basis that their issue is inherently non-justiciable or that 
it raises a so-called “political question”.11 [Emphasis added.] 
In 1986, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the principles of funda-
mental justice solely embraced procedural concerns. The argument had been 
advanced in the Supreme Court that judicial review for conformity with the 
principles of fundamental justice should be restricted to procedural concerns 
because “the judiciary is neither representative of, nor responsive to the elec-
torate on whose behalf, and under whose authority are selected and given effect 
in the laws of the land”. Mr. Justice Lamer (as he then was) quickly dismissed 
this argument: 
This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the entrenchment of 
the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for worse, been settled by the very 
coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982. It ought not be forgotten that the 
historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution was taken not by the 
courts but by the elected representatives of the people of Canada. It was those rep-
resentatives who extended the scope of constitutional adjudication and entrusted 
the courts with this new and onerous responsibility.12  
The Court proceeded to dismiss the relevance of the substantive/procedural 
dichotomy as being a uniquely American approach. It is true that the American 
doctrine of substantive due process allowed American courts to extend consti-
tutional protection beyond the four corners of the guarantees explicitly pro-
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vided for in the Constitution, and as such, the doctrine appeared to infuse 
American courts with greater political clout. However, the Court concluded that 
“the substantive and procedural dichotomy narrows the issue almost to an all or 
nothing proposition”.13 Careful to ensure that review of public policy and the 
merits of legislation still remained beyond the scope of constitutional review, 
the Court had this to say about substantive principles of fundamental justice: 
[There is an assumption] that only a procedural content to “principles of fundamen-
tal justice” can prevent the courts from adjudicating upon the merits or wisdom of 
enactments. If this assumption is accepted, the inevitable corollary, with which I 
would have to then agree, is that the legislator intended that the words “principles 
of fundamental justice” refer to procedure only.  
But I do not share this assumption. 
. . . 
The task of the Court is not to choose between substantive and procedural 
content per se but to secure for persons “the full benefit of the Charter’s pro-
tection . . . under s. 7 while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public pol-
icy.”14 [Emphasis added.] 
The exhortation to avoid adjudicating the merits of public policy rings hol-
low in light of the assertion that the application and creation of substantive 
principles of justice may be necessary in order to secure for persons the “full 
benefit of the Charter’s protection”. What is missing is a coherent statement of 
the nature and form of substantive principles of justice. The Court is only able 
to advise us of the following: 
[T]he principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of our le-
gal system. They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inherent 
domain of the judiciary as guardians of the justice system.  
. . . 
Consequently, the principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic 
tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process, but also of other components 
of our legal system.  
We should not be surprised that many of the principles of fundamental justice 
are procedural in nature. Our common law has been a law of remedies and proce-
dures. . . . This is not to say, however, that the principles of fundamental justice are 
limited solely to procedural guarantees. Rather the proper approach to the determi-
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nation of the principles of fundamental justice is quite simply one in which. . . . 
“future growth will be based on historical roots”.15  
I am quite certain that Coke, Blackstone, Stephens and Lamer all entertain 
very different ideas as to what comprises “the basic tenets of our legal system”, 
so the Court’s pronouncement only informs us that fundamental justice is not 
restricted to procedural concerns without really providing any illumination of 
what will fill the gap once the restriction is lifted. In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada invalidated a provincial, absolute liability, offence of driving 
while under suspension. The principle of fundamental justice violated by this 
legislation was the notion that imprisonment cannot be imposed without some 
degree of fault. Fault-based criminality was declared a principle of fundamental 
justice, and this case triggered a series of cases which reviewed various of-
fences to determine if the statutory definition of the crime contained a constitu-
tionally acceptable minimum level of fault. Four forms of constructive murder 
were invalidated on the basis that the offence of murder requires subjective 
foresight of death as a minimum fault or mens rea requirement.16 It had ap-
peared that the 1986 Motor Vehicle Reference17 signaled the beginning of an era 
in which the balance of power slightly shifted in favour of the judicial branch 
of government armed with ill-defined principles of substantive, fundamental 
justice.  
In retrospect, the Motor Vehicle Reference did not effect a significant change 
in the balance of power. First, the substantive principle of fundamental justice 
in this case concerned issues which historically have been within the expertise 
of the judiciary. Mens rea, actus reus, excuses and justifications have all been 
developed primarily within the context of court decisions. Parliament has never 
provided much guidance with respect to the fault requirements of a criminal 
offence, preferring to leave this issue for judicial development. Consequently, 
judicial review for a constitutionally sound minimum level of fault echoes the 
role and function of common law courts for the past few hundred years. The 
Motor Vehicle Reference did not actually signal the beginning of a rigorous 
form of constitutional review which would incidentally trench upon Parlia-
ment’s policy choices — it was just a reflection of the Court engaged in a very 
familiar and comfortable discourse. 
Second, the articulation of a principle of fundamental justice — no impris-
onment without fault — may have been full of sound and fury, signifying noth-
ing. Since the invalidation of the constructive homicide provisions in the late 
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 Id., at 503, 512-13. 
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 R. v. Vaillancourt (1987), 60 C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Martineau (1990), 58 C.C.C. 
(3d) 353 (S.C.C.). 
17
  Supra, note 12. 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)  Fundamental Justice and Political Power 129 
 
1980s, the courts have found few occasions to invalidate offences on the basis 
that they contain a constitutionally deficient level of fault. The one exception to 
this trend may be the recent Ruzic case,18 in which the Court concluded that 
normative involuntariness was a principle of fundamental justice thus requiring 
a more expansive approach to the limited statutory defence of duress. This case 
aside, the first substantive principle of fundamental justice articulated by the 
Court had a short life span. The Court’s doctrine stipulated that a subjective 
form of mens rea is constitutionally required only when the offence contains a 
high degree of stigma and is subject to a high level of punishment; yet, six 
years later this Court also concluded that the offence of manslaughter did not 
have a sufficiently high level of stigma and punishment to trigger the substan-
tive requirements of fundamental justice respecting the minimum level of 
fault.19 If manslaughter is not a stigmatizing classification with a high penalty 
(maximum life), then it is unlikely that any other criminal offence will ever 
trigger the constitutional requirement of subjective fault. After the flurry of 
mens rea cases, it is clear that Parliament will never be able to combine abso-
lute liability with imprisonment in the future, nor will it be able to create a 
crime of negligent murder. These were significant developments in the short 
history of Charter adjudication in Canada, but in a practical sense the substan-
tive principle of fault-based criminality has been restricted to invalidating an 
archaic relic (constructive murder) and prohibiting a form of legislation which 
rarely occurs (combining absolute liability with imprisonment).  
The search for specific principles of fundamental justice which arise out of 
the “basic tenets of the legal system” has proved to be a difficult exercise. It 
may appear helpful for the Court to remind us that “section 7 must be construed 
having regard to those interests and against the applicable principles of policies 
that have animated legislative and judicial practice in the field”,20 yet the prob-
lems remain in identifying principles which deserve the label of “fundamental”. 
Seven years after the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Court had another opportu-
nity to illuminate the principles of fundamental justice. In Rodriguez,21 the 
Court addressed the question of whether the criminal prohibition on assisted 
suicide violated section 7 because it prevented disabled people from ending 
their lives as a release from chronic pain and suffering. The Court rejected the 
argument that respect for human dignity is a principle of fundamental justice on 
the basis that “dignity” is too vague a prescription to constitute a principle of 
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 R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687. 
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fundamental justice. As for the exercise of discerning these principles, the 
Court stated: 
Discerning the principles of fundamental justice with which deprivation of life, 
liberty or security of the person must accord, in order to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, is not an easy task. A mere common law rule does not suffice to constitute 
a principle of fundamental justice, rather, as the term implies, principles upon 
which there is some consensus that they are vital or fundamental to our societal no-
tion of justice are required. Principles of fundamental justice must not, however, be 
so broad as to be no more than vague generalizations about what our society con-
siders to be ethical or moral. They must be capable of being identified with some 
precision and applied to situations in a manner which yields an understandable re-
sult. They must also, in my view, be legal principles.22 
The Court also noted that the traditional roles of legislature versus judiciary 
should be respected; however, respect for the traditional division of powers 
does not mean that the courts cannot review legislation for compliance with 
substantive principles of fundamental justice: 
On the one hand, the Court must be conscious of its proper role in the constitu-
tional make-up of our form of democratic government and not seek to make fun-
damental changes to long-standing policy on the basis of general constitutional 
principles and its own view of the wisdom of legislation. On the other hand, the 
Court has not only the power but the duty to deal with this question if it appears 
that the Charter has been violated. The power to review legislation to determine 
whether it conforms to the Charter extends not only to procedural matters but also 
substantive issues. The principles of fundamental justice leave a great deal of scope 
for personal judgment and the Court must be careful that they do not become prin-
ciples which are of fundamental justice in the eye of the beholder only.23 [emphasis 
added] 
Without identifying a specific principle of fundamental justice, the Court 
upheld the prohibition on assisted suicide on the basis that the state had two 
overriding interests: the existence of a perceived consensus in favour of an 
absolute prohibition and the goal of preventing abuse and exploitation of vul-
nerable individuals. At the most basic level of analysis, all that happened in this 
case was a balancing of Rodriguez’s interest against the societal interests repre-
sented by the law. There did not appear to be a clearly stated principle of fun-
damental justice being debated. Two years later the Court resolved another 
difficult and sensitive rights claim with a similar balancing act. In B. (R.)24 the 
Court addressed the issue of whether it was violative of section 7 for the state to 
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provide a blood transfusion to a child over the religious objections of parents 
who believe that the transfusion of blood is a sacrilege. Although the Court was 
badly divided on the threshold issue of “liberty and security”, a majority of the 
Court concluded that the legislation providing for the compelled transfusion 
was constitutional because the fundamental rights of the parents were overrid-
den by the state’s right to protect the life and health of children, and because 
this objective had been pursued in a manner consistent with fair process.  
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada first introduced this balancing ap-
proach to section 7,25 and within two years the Court was now saying that 
“[f]undamental justice in our Canadian legal tradition . . . is primarily designed 
to ensure that a fair balance be struck between the interests of society and those 
of its citizens”.26 In fact, the most recent pronouncement from the Court on the 
meaning of fundamental justice indicates that the search for specific principles 
has been overtaken by the allure of balancing: 
The principles of fundamental justice are to be found in “the basic tenets of our 
legal system”: . . . “They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the 
inherent domain of the judiciary as guardian of the legal system” . . . The relevant 
principles of fundamental justice are determined by a contextual approach that 
“takes into account the nature of the decision to be made” . . . The approach is es-
sentially one of balancing. As we said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the . . . balanc-
ing process that the outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix 
of contextual factors put into the balance”.27 
Any doubt about the primacy of section 7 balancing was laid to rest in an of-
ten overlooked decision of the Court in 1997. In Godbout,28 the Court con-
fronted a fundamental justice claim in a non-criminal context. In order to work 
for a municipality the employee was required to reside in the municipality, and 
the Court invalidated the regulation on the basis that it unjustifiably interfered 
with the “irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may 
make inherently private choice free from state interference”.29 Prior to Godbout, 
the Court had already identified that “liberty” under section 7 extends beyond 
physical restrictions on freedom to encompass matters which are “inherently 
personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to 
the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence”.30  
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Godbout suggests that the Court will undertake exacting constitutional scru-
tiny when the law interferes with the right to decisions of “fundamental per-
sonal importance”, and the Court has been confronted with many cases which 
engage personal decisions of this nature. For example, in Morgentaler31 the 
Court was faced with the right of a woman to decide what would be best for her 
and her unborn child. In B. (R.) the Court was faced with the right of parents to 
choose a medical intervention which was consistent with their religious beliefs, 
and in Rodriguez the issue concerned the right of a disabled person to end her 
life just as a non-disabled can do so. These cases all engaged fundamental, 
personal decisions; however, invalidation only took place in the Morgentaler 
case, and this invalidation was based primarily on procedural concerns and not 
upon any  
substantive principle of justice. In the other two cases the Court balanced com-
peting interests and found a state interest to override the decision of “funda-
mental personal importance”. 
It is obvious that the Charter will be trivialized if its guarantees apply to per-
sonal decisions which are picayune and petty; however, creating the category of 
“fundamental personal decision” does not really help in the analysis. First, 
dividing personal decisions into fundamental and non-fundamental is a value-
laden exercise beyond the purview of judicial understanding. Second, designat-
ing a decision as fundamental does not assist because the Court does not pro-
vide any specific or unique methodology for analyzing the constitutionality of 
state interference with this type of fundamental decision. The B. (R.) and Rod-
riguez cases both show that the designation of a decision as fundamental does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that state interference is unconstitutional.  
The seeds of a coherent analysis are found in the Godbout case. First, the 
Court confirms that there is a substantive component to section 7. This compo-
nent requires that in restricting life, liberty or security, the legislature must be 
pursuing constitutionally valid objectives in a procedurally fair manner. The 
Court stated: 
The text of s. 7 provides that a deprivation by the state of an individual’s right to 
life, liberty or security of the person will not violate the Canadian Charter unless it 
contravenes the “principles of fundamental justice”. Over the years since the Char-
ter’s inception, this Court has repeatedly been called upon to interpret that phrase, 
so as to determine in particular cases whether a Charter violation has, in fact, oc-
curred. In the early days of Charter adjudication, questions arose as to whether the 
principles of fundamental justice included within their ambit a substantive element, 
in addition to the guarantees of natural justice or procedural fairness. That issue 
was conclusively settled by this Court in the Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 
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S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536, where all members of the panel seized of the case 
agreed that the principles of fundamental justice are not limited merely to rules of 
procedure but include as well a substantive component. This has meant that if dep-
rivations of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person are to survive Char-
ter scrutiny, they must be “fundamentally just” not only in terms of the process by 
which they are carried out but also in terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as 
measured against basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal system more 
generally.32 
Once the relevant life, liberty or security interest is identified, the Court must 
then perform the following balancing act: 
But just as this Court has relied on specific principles or policies to guide its 
analysis in particular cases, it has also acknowledged that looking to “the principles 
of fundamental justice” often involves the more general endeavour of balancing the 
constitutional right of the individual claimant against the countervailing interests of 
the state. In other words, deciding whether the principles of fundamental justice 
have been respected in a particular case has been understood not only as requiring 
that the infringement at issue be evaluated in light of a specific principle pertinent 
to the case, but also as permitting a broader inquiry into whether the right to life, 
liberty or security of the person asserted by the individual can, in the circum-
stances, justifiably be violated given the interests or purposes sought to be ad-
vanced in doing so. To my mind, performing this balancing test in considering the 
fundamental justice aspect of s. 7 is both eminently sensible and perfectly consis-
tent with the aim and import of that provision, since the notion that individual 
rights may, in some circumstances, be subordinated to substantial and compelling 
collective interests is itself a basic tenet of our legal system lying at or very near the 
core of our most deeply rooted juridical convictions. We need look no further than 
the Charter itself to be satisfied of this. Expressed in the language of s. 7, the no-
tion of balancing individual rights against collective interests itself reflects what 
may rightfully be termed a “principle of fundamental justice” which, if respected, 
can serve as the basis for justifying the state’s infringement of an otherwise sacro-
sanct constitutional right.33 
Consistent with American due process analysis, the Court appears to require 
the countervailing state interest to be both “compelling and substantial”; how-
ever, it is unclear if this high standard only applies when the state interference 
pertains to decisions of a fundamental, personal nature. As for substantive 
principles of justice, the only illumination provided is that the substantive 
component of section 7 allows a court to assess the “ends” sought to be 
achieved by a legislature to determine if these “ends” are consistent with the 
basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal system more generally. 
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This type of circular reasoning leads us back to the start. Presumably, the bal-
ancing approach to section 7 was designed to obviate the need to find elusive 
and specific principles of fundamental justice; however, the Court requires the 
balancing to take into account the “basic tenets of our judicial system”. In 
effect, all the Court is saying is that pursuing a legislative objective not consis-
tent with substantive principles of fundamental justice will violate substantive 
principles of fundamental justice.  
The movement away from “basic tenets” to “balancing” does not serve the 
interests of justice. First, balancing is inherently subjective and indeterminate. 
Second, balancing tends to allow for the undue infusion of personal, political 
ideology to dominate the decision-making process. Although I have asserted 
that the Constitution inexorably leads to increased political content in the adju-
dicative process, balancing still remains undesirable because it tends to mask 
this content in the language of neutral balancing. Third, balancing interests 
under section 7 makes no sense in the context of a Constitution which already 
contains a provision (section 1) which specifically mandates balancing as a last 
step in the analysis before invalidation. As one commentator has noted: 
This approach is problematic in that it weakens the ability of the Charter to operate 
as a rights-based, counter-majoritarian instrument. Consensus may be an appropriate 
tool for legislators, whose function it is to weigh public policy options, but it is 
wholly inappropriate as a definitional element of a legal test, namely the fundamental 
justice test, the purpose of which is to assess whether an individual right has been vio-
lated. To say that a Charter right has not been infringed because there exists a consen-
sus among reasonable people that the infringement is justified, nullifies the very 
ability of the Charter to guarantee individual freedoms. Individual rights-bearers are 
left unprotected against the possibility of “majoritarian malevolence, ignorance or in-
difference.” Furthermore, the consensus-based balancing approach to fundamental 
justice makes a section 1 analysis all but redundant, since it shifts the burden of proof 
to the Charter claimant to demonstrate the absence of a valid state interest in order to 
prove that there has been a violation of fundamental justice. Such a demonstration it-
self includes the formidable task of proving the absence of a societal consensus in 
support of the state interest. This formulation of section 7 of the Charter is completely 
at odds with that used in the context of other Charter provisions, where the burden of 
proving the validity of the state interest rests, as a positive burden, on the State under 
section 1. Indeed, as noted by McLachlin J. in Rodriguez, “it is not generally appro-
priate that the complainant be obliged to negate societal interests at the s. 7 stage, 
where the burden lies upon her, but that the matter be left for s. 1, where the burden 
lies on the state.”34 
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The “basic tenets” approach may be fraught with some conceptual problems, 
but nonetheless, its application should result in a more determinate and trans-
parent process than one performed by balancing. With respect to finding spe-
cific principles of justice, it has been noted that: 
Additional cases, such as Singh, Swain and Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan 
Toronto have all applied this definition of fundamental justice. This approach to 
fundamental justice has many advantages as regards the protection of the individual 
freedoms of the complainant, including: (1) state interests are only considered un-
der section 1 where the burden of proof is on the state; (2) the very existence of the 
principles of fundamental justice is not predicated or dependent upon societal 
agreement; and (3) the definition avoids an overly narrow interpretation of section 
7 protections, thereby giving the Charter greater scope to operate as a rights-
protecting instrument. Thus, if the objective of the Charter is to effectively guaran-
tee individual freedoms, then clearly the Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act definition of 
fundamental justice is both analytically superior and more just than its “balancing 
interests” counterpart in Rodriguez.35 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that their preference for 
balancing led to a confused overlap between sections 1 and 7 of the Charter. In 
Mills,36 the Court tried to dig themselves out of this quandary by asserting that 
the interests being balanced under section 7 are different than the interests 
balanced under section 1. The Court stated: 
It is also important to distinguish between balancing the principles of fundamental 
justice under s. 7 and balancing interests under s. 1 of the Charter. The s. 1 jurispru-
dence that has developed in this Court is in many respects quite similar to the balanc-
ing process mandated by s. 7. As McLachlin J. stated for the Court in Cunningham v. 
Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143, at p. 152, regarding the latter: “The . . . question is 
whether, from a substantive point of view, the change in the law strikes the right bal-
ance between the accused’s interests and interests of society.” Much the same could 
be said regarding the central question posed by s. 1.  
However, there are several important differences between the balancing exercises 
under ss. 1 and 7. The most important difference is that the issue under s. 7 is the 
delineation of the boundaries of the rights in question whereas under s. 1 the ques-
tion is whether the violation of these boundaries may be justified. The different role 
played by s. 22.1 and 7 also has important implications regarding which party bears 
the burden of proof. If interests are balanced under s. 7 then it is the rights claimant 
who bears the burden of proving that the balance struck by the impugned legisla-
tion violates s. 7. If interests are balanced under s. 1 then it is the state that bears the 
burden of justifying the infringement of the Charter rights.  
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Because of these differences, the nature of the issues and interests to be balanced 
is not the same under the two sections. As Lamer J. (as he then was) stated in Re 
B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, supra, at p. 503: “the principles of fundamental justice are 
to be found in the basic tenets of our legal system”. In contrast, s. 1 is concerned 
with the values underlying a free and democratic society, which are broader in na-
ture. In R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, Dickson C.J. stated, at p. 136, that these 
values and principles “embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity 
of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of 
a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social 
and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups 
in society”. In R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at p. 737, Dickson C.J. de-
scribed such values and principles as “numerous, covering the guarantees enumer-
ated in the Charter and more”.37 
At a superficial level this distinction makes sense; however, it naively pre-
supposes that there is a clear line of demarcation between legal concerns and 
political/philosophical concerns. No such line exists, and in many cases the 
Court will be compelled to exercise political choices. In 1999, the Court finally 
recognized the paradox of balancing under section 7 followed by further bal-
ancing under section 1; however, in 1997 the Court in Godbout seemed to 
conclude that there was no clear line of demarcation between section 1 and 
section 7 balancing. After concluding that the residency requirement for em-
ployment in the municipality violated section 7, the Court stated:  
I should explain that I see no need to examine the issues in this appeal under the 
rubric of s. 1 of the Charter, given that all the considerations pertinent to such an 
inquiry have, I think already been canvassed in the discussion dealing with funda-
mental justice. Moreover, and as this Court has previously held, a violation of s. 7 
will normally only be justified under s. 1 in the most exceptional of circum-
stances.38 
Ironically, the movement from ascertaining substantive principles of funda-
mental justice to open-ended balancing was in all likelihood predicated on the 
fear that creating/discovering substantive principles of fundamental justice 
would expose the courts to accusations of appropriating political power. The 
primary and recurring objection to the United States Supreme Court’s employ-
ment of substantive due process, especially in the Roe v. Wade39 abortion deci-
sion, has been the claim that this process is equivalent to the clearly political 
enterprise of amending a constitution. If the Court was concerned that the 
articulation of specific principles not explicitly contained in the Constitution 
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would thrust the Court too deeply into the political arena, then it has been 
operating upon a mistaken premise because balancing is inherently more politi-
cal in nature: 
Where the court has not opted to use s. 1 as the venue in which to balance societal 
interests with individual interests, problems arise. For example, in Cunningham, 
McLachlin J. stated that fundamental justice entailed a question of “[w]hether, from 
a substantive point of view, the change in the law strikes the right balance between 
the accused’s interests and the interests of society”. As Hogg notes with respect to 
this formulation, “It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Court was here in-
terpreting substantive fundamental justice as justifying the court in striking down a 
law whenever the Court disagreed with the policy implemented by the law.”40 
Discerning substantive principles of fundamental justice may prove to be a 
futile quest even though the Court has had little difficulty discerning principles 
of a procedural nature. In the early cases of Mills41 and Rahey,42 Lamer C.J. 
asserted that sections 8-15 of the Charter “address specific deprivations” of the 
more general right emobodied by section 7, and in this way much of the content 
of fundamental justice is animated and coloured by the other legal rights con-
tained in the Constitution. This theory, which has been adopted by other mem-
bers of the Court,43 does not augur well for the development of substantive 
principles because the other legal rights contained in the Charter all address 
procedural concerns.  
In the world of procedural justice, the Court does not feel the same con-
straints as it would in the realm of substantive justice. Procedure and form fall 
within the expertise and experience of the judicial branch of government, and 
although procedural forms can at times serve political purposes, the reasonable 
observer would not accuse the Court of appropriating political power for taking 
an activist approach to procedural justice. For example, the right to make full 
answer and defence is a principle of fundamental justice. Stated at this level of 
generality, the assertion cannot be gainsaid. However, the Court has gone much 
further by providing a specific set of procedural requirements designed to 
protect full answer and defence. In 1998, the Court stated: 
The right to make full answer and defence is protected under s. 7 of the Charter. It 
is one of the principles of fundamental justice. . . . The right to make full answer 
and defence manifests itself in several more specific rights and principles, such as 
the right to full and timely disclosure, the right to know the case to be met before 
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opening one’s defence, the principles governing the re-opening of the Crown’s 
case, as well as various rights of cross-examination, among others. The right is in-
tegrally linked to the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial, and the 
principle against self-incrimination.44 
Section 7 has proved to be a very effective vehicle for enshrining procedural 
rights not explicitly contained in the Charter. The right to remain silent is not 
mentioned in the Charter, and the right against self-incrimination is restricted to 
the protection against testimonial compulsion (section 11(c)) and “use” immu-
nity for any statements given in other proceedings (section 13). Nonetheless, 
the Court has constructed a fairly sophisticated set of rights under section 7 to 
protect against “subversion” of the right to remain silent, and to provide “de-
rivative use” immunity, in addition to “use” immunity, for compelled state-
ments45. These set of rights became enshrined as “specific manifestations” of 
the operation of fundamental justice despite the fact that these rights were not 
even protected at common law. The Court has clearly adopted the “living tree” 
metaphor46 of the Charter when approaching issues of procedural justice.  
In light of the vibrant and activist approach taken with respect to procedural 
aspects of fundamental justice, there may be some lessons to be learnt from this 
legacy about the operation of substantive principles of fundamental justice. 
First, the legacy shows that conformity with international standards is not nec-
essarily the hallmark of fundamental justice. Although the Court has recently 
changed its approach to the constitutional analysis of extradition largely on the 
basis of becoming “informed by international law”,47 it is clear from the proce-
dural cases that the Court will not invalidate legislation simply because most 
other common law jurisdictions frown upon the rule. In Morgentaler,48 the 
Court would not invalidate the provision allowing Crown appeals from jury 
acquittals despite the fact that the U.K. and the U.S. have always viewed this 
practice to be an attack on the integrity of the jury. In Rose,49 the Court would 
not invalidate the provision compelling the accused to address the jury first if 
he/she elects to call evidence in defence notwithstanding the fact that most 
common law jurisdictions preserve the right of the defence to address the jury 
last. Conversely, the Court has on two occasions declared police investigative 
practices to be unconstitutional despite the fact that the United States Supreme 
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Court had previously given constitutional approval to these practices.50 A vi-
brant and unique approach to the procedural components of fundamental justice 
required Canadian police to discontinue their useful practice of warrantless 
body-pack interceptions by police agents and the practice of eliciting confes-
sions by the “potted plant” technique (i.e., placing a police agent in a holding 
cell with a recently arrested accused). Principles of fundamental justice do not 
have to be in conformity with past practice and international standards: they 
can be uniquely Canadian.  
If past practice is not a hallmark of fundamental justice, then the historical 
evolution of common law rules may not be determinative of the analysis. This 
is best demonstrated with respect to the “right to confront one’s accuser”. The 
Court has said that “[t]he adversarial nature of the trial process has been recog-
nized as a principle of fundamental justice”,51 yet the right of confrontation has 
been excluded from this category.52 This is somewhat ironic because one of the 
defining historical features of the adversarial process has been this right to 
confront one’s accuser. At an intuitive level, one might assume that a principle 
only becomes “fundamental” when it is an organizing and defining principle of 
sound historical pedigree. On the other hand, a court should not allow itself to 
be shackled by the dead weight of precedent.  
Attenuating the connection between historical pedigree and the “fundamen-
tal” nature of a principle raises the spectre of political infiltration. Principles 
should be immutable, whereas political concerns change with the time. This 
infiltration is apparent in relation to the disparaged “right to confront one’s 
accusers”. The legislative encroachment of the right to confrontation has 
largely been predicated upon the political objective of reforming a criminal 
process which is frightening and alienating to vulnerable witness groups. Al-
lowing a child to testify behind a screen is part and parcel of a larger political 
objective of encouraging the reporting of under-reported domestic violence. 
These objectives are laudable and should be promoted; however, it seems that 
these political objectives should be more appropriately addressed in the context 
of a section 1 analysis where the Court is explicitly mandated to take political 
objectives into consideration. 
Of course, the Court is careful to ensure that its process of discerning princi-
ples of fundamental justice does not appear to be inextricably intertwined with 
political concerns. This may explain why public opinion is not considered a 
controlling feature of the principles of fundamental justice. Challenges to the 
marijuana prohibition and to the assisted suicide provisions both failed despite 
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the fact that there have been fairly consistent public opinion polls indicating 
majority support for decriminalization.53 It is not surprising that public opinion 
does not define the “fundamental” nature of a principle of justice because “[t]he 
Charter is designed to protect the accused from the majority, so the enforce-
ment of the Charter must not be left to that majority”.54 Nonetheless, it is hard 
to escape the fact that a principle cannot really be deemed fundamental unless 
some degree of public consensus has emerged regarding the importance of the 
principle. In recently concluding that extradition which in all probability will 
lead to torture in the requesting state violates section 7 of the Charter, the Court 
noted that  
“[w]hile we would hesitate to draw a direct equation between government policy or 
public opinion at any particular moment and the principles of fundamental justice, 
the fact that successive governments and Parliaments have refused to inflict torture 
and the death penalty surely reflects a fundamental Canadian.55 
It is impossible to discern principles of fundamental justice without some 
degree of political content and ideology informing the process. Being more 
comfortable in the realm of procedural justice, the Court will try to find a pro-
cedural argument to defuse the potential accusation that a section 7 decision is 
based upon raw, political considerations. In Morgentaler, the majority of the 
Court was careful to base its invalidation of the abortion law on a procedurally 
flawed exempting process, rather than on an assertion that it is a principle of 
fundamental justice that a woman can exercise full autonomous choice with 
respect to decisions pertaining to her bodily integrity. Similarly, the 1999 volte-
face with respect to extraditing individuals to face the death penalty provides an 
interesting example of masking politics. In a 1991 decision56 the Court found 
no constitutional violation in extraditing an individual to the United States to 
face the death penalty. In 1999 this ruling was reversed.57 Of course, one would 
not expect the Court to candidly admit that they had changed their political 
views on the justifiability of state executions, yet the rapid volte-face in its 
balancing act under section 7 cries out for an explanation. Accordingly, the 
Court tried to ground the decision on a changed perspective in relation to a 
procedural concern respecting the operation of the death penalty. The Court 
stated: 
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We affirm that it is generally for the Minister, not the Court, to assess the weight 
of competing considerations in extradition policy, but the availability of the death 
penalty, like death itself, opens up a different dimension. The difficulties and occa-
sional miscarriages of the criminal law are located in an area of human experience 
that falls squarely within “the inherent domain of the judiciary as a guardian of the 
justice system” . . . 
... 
The “balancing process” mandated by Kindler and Ng remains a flexible instru-
ment. The difficulty in this case is that the Minister proposes to send the respon-
dents without assurances into the death penalty controversy at a time when the legal 
system of the requesting country is under such sustained and authoritative internal 
attack. Although rumblings of this controversy in Canada, the United States and the 
United Kingdom pre-dated Kindler and Ng, the concern has grown greatly in depth 
and detailed proof in the intervening years. The imposition of a moratorium (de 
facto or otherwise) in some of the retentionist states of the United States attests to 
this concern, but a moratorium itself is not conclusive, any more than the lifting of 
a moratorium would be. What is important is the recognition that despite the best 
efforts of all concerned, the judicial system is and will remain fallible and reversi-
ble whereas the death penalty will forever remain final and irreversible.58  
Although it is true that there have been recent studies demonstrating the 
tragic miscarriages of justice in relation to capital punishment, it is hard to 
imagine that the Court was not aware of this problem in 1991. In addition, 
much of the international objections to capital punishment had been expressed 
by 1991, and it cannot be said that there had been a revolutionary change in 
international perspectives in the intervening eight years. Balancing state inter-
ests and individual interests is an inherently political exercise — different 
people at different times in different contexts will strike this balance in differ-
ent ways. The discourse may appear to be based upon “principles”, but in actu-
ality it is drowning in policy. As Peter Russell has noted: 
[Judges] may mask their non-legal ideas or assumptions and make their opinion 
appear as if it were a purely legal deduction . . . Judges who conceal their political, 
social or economic reasoning may be pursuing a fairly cunning political strategy 
designed to reduce the political exposure of their court.59  
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III.  CONSENSUAL CRIMES, THE HARM PRINCIPLE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE 
With the preceding discussion in mind, we can now turn to the question 
posed at the outset: does section 7 of the Charter have a role to play when it 
appears that there is no constructive purpose behind a legislative enactment? 
This question is best resolved in the context of consensual crimes for which 
there is a great deal of debate over the justifiability of resorting to criminal law 
to prohibit the private, consensual, pleasure-seeking activities of adults. 
Whether we are examining prostitution-related offences, obscenity-related 
offences, gambling offences or drug offences, we are confronted with two 
cogent claims for decriminalization. First, it is asserted that there is no conclu-
sive proof that these activities are harmful to society or that proof of harm is 
entirely lacking. Second, it is asserted that prohibiting activities fueled by 
human desire will only serve to create a violent black market and will inevita-
bly trigger social and crime problems unrelated to the initial pleasure-seeking 
activity. The nagging question is whether these public policy concerns can be 
translated into a coherent principle of fundamental justice.  
Of course, one need not necessarily construct a relevant substantive principle 
of fundamental justice if one relies upon the balancing act promoted by the 
Court in the past 10 years. Beyond the criticisms of the balancing act under 
section 7 outlined earlier, the problem with reliance upon balancing with re-
spect to consensual crimes is that two questions remain unclear: 1) whether the 
need to find an overriding and compelling state interest only applies to “deci-
sions of a fundamental personal nature”, and, if so, 2) whether consensual 
pleasure-seeking activity engages a decision of a fundamental personal nature. 
Despite the fact that a strong argument can be made for characterizing hedonis-
tic pursuits as a fundamental decision, it may be difficult to persuade a court to 
accept this proposition. If hedonistic pursuits are not fundamental, it is unclear 
under the existing doctrine how the court is to approach the balancing exercise. 
Nevertheless, whether the balancing approach is taken, or whether reliance is 
placed upon a specific and substantive principle of fundamental justice, the 
review under section 7 will require some assessment of the merits of public 
policy.  
Indirect review of the merits of legislation can be achieved by reliance upon 
two accepted principles of fundamental justice: the prohibition of vague laws60 
and the prohibition of overbroad laws.61 There is significant overlap between 
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these two principles and they only permit indirect review as they are predicated 
on only reviewing the means chosen to achieve legislative ends. The ends or 
objectives of legislation are not questioned as part of this review process. How-
ever, it can be assumed that if Parliament has confusion over the objectives 
being sought, there is a good chance that some of this confusion will carry over 
to the drafting of an ill-defined and general law. Much could be written about 
the twin vices of vagueness and overbreadth, but the sad reality is that these 
doctrines are toothless. The way in which the Supreme Court has characterized 
and constructed the vagueness doctrine ensures that it could only serve to in-
validate the most poorly-defined offence imaginable. The Court has actually 
only invalidated one provision (denial of bail in the “public interest”),62 and 
there is little chance that the doctrine will fare any better in the realm of con-
sensual crime. Despite one bold invalidation by the Court, the overbreadth 
doctrine will fare no better. Overbreadth review raises a whole host of prob-
lems, and, as Professor Hogg has noted, the doctrine  
raises some practical and theoretical difficulties, and confers an exceedingly discre-
tionary power of review on the Court. The doctrine requires that the terms of a law 
be no broader than is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the law. But the pur-
pose of the law is a judicial construct, which can be defined widely or narrowly as 
the reviewing court sees fit. In [Heywood] for example, Cory J. who wrote for the 
majority, defined the purpose of the law as being for the protection of children, 
while Gonthier J, who wrote for the dissenting minority, defined the purpose of the 
law as being for the protection of adults as well as children . . . Even if agreement 
could be reached on the purpose of the law, the question of whether the terms of the 
law are no broader than is needed to carry out the purpose raises a host of interpre-
tive, policy and empirical questions . . . It must be recognized . . . that a judge who 
disapproves of a law will always be able to find that it is overbroad.63 
Turning to specific consensual crimes, the bawdy house and prostitution 
provisions were unsuccessfully challenged in the late 1980s.64 A recent attempt 
to resurrect this challenge also failed.65 The provisions were found to have 
sufficient clarity to escape invalidation on the grounds of vagueness, and the 
only substantive principle of justice raised in this case was based upon the 
economic right to earn a living. The Court clearly rejected economic liberty as 
a component of the section 7 right. The section 7 arguments raised in the case 
did not revolve around any consideration of the merits of criminal justice pol-
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icy. No attempt was made to mount an argument that the provisions do not 
serve the public interest in any constructive way. Putting aside doctrinal limita-
tions, it would be impossible to mount this argument without tendering an 
extensive array of legislative facts, and it does not appear that this type of 
evidence was introduced on this challenge. If the assessment of legislative 
objectives is part and parcel of a section 7 claim, and not a section 1 claim, then 
the applicant bears the burden of proving the violation. Although much of the 
information relating to legislative objectives will be uniquely in the possession 
of the Crown, it will be incumbent upon the applicant or accused to discharge a 
persuasive burden relating to proof of the absence of sound policy supporting 
the enactment. Rhetorical flourishes by counsel will not suffice. Invalidation 
will require a careful marshaling of legislative facts. As the Supreme Court of 
Canada has said on two different occasions: 
Charter cases will frequently be concerned with concepts and principles that are 
of fundamental importance to Canadian society. For example, issues pertaining to 
freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the right to life, liberty and the se-
curity of the individual will have to be considered by the courts. Decisions on these 
issues must be carefully considered as they will profoundly affect the lives of Ca-
nadians and all residents of Canada. In light of the importance and the impact that 
these decisions may have in the future, the courts have every right to expect and in-
deed to insist upon the careful preparation and presentation of a factual basis in 
most Charter cases. The relevant facts put  
forward may cover a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic and 
political aspects. Often expert opinion as to the future impact of the impugned leg-
islation and the result of the possible decisions pertaining to it may be of great as-
sistance to the courts.  
Charter decisions should not and must not be made in a factual vacuum. To at-
tempt to do so would trivialize the Charter and inevitably result in ill-considered 
opinions.66  
In light of this exhortation from the Supreme Court, I mounted a challenge to 
the obscenity provisions with the aid of viva voce evidence from state officials 
and retailers to demonstrate that obscenity law operated as a vague prior re-
straint on expression.67 This challenge was eventually overtaken by the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision in Butler,68 in which the Court summarily 
dismissed the claim that the law was vague, and it ultimately upheld the law 
based upon the law being a reasonable limit on freedom of expression. Even 
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though Butler did not directly provide support for a claim that section 7 permits 
judicial review of the merits of the law, there were two seeds planted in this 
case which would become integral to the quest for finding a sound juridical 
basis for challenging the constitutionality of consensual crimes. 
First, the Supreme Court rejected “legal moralism” as a sound justification 
for criminal law. The Court stated that “[t]o impose a certain standard of public 
and sexual morality, solely because it reflects the conventions of a given com-
munity, is inimical to the exercise and enjoyment of individual freedoms”.69 
The rejection of legal moralism (and perhaps its distant relative, legal paternal-
ism) suggests that a harm-based justification must support the enactment of 
criminal law. The type of harm and the level of proof of harm is not addressed 
in the case, save and except for noting that in the context of obscenity, Parlia-
ment was acting upon a “reasoned apprehension of harm”.70  
The Butler case led me to work on constructing a harm-based constitutional 
challenge to the gambling provisions based upon an extensive record of legisla-
tive facts showing that “legalized” gambling had become an everyday Canadian 
pastime. Provincial governments were amassing huge revenues from the recent 
explosion in regulated gambling. I argued that the intense involvement of the 
state in gambling activities completely undercut the argument that gambling 
was harmful to society. Surely the province would not engage in activities 
contrary to the public interest, and their decision to promote gambling showed 
that there has been a change in social, political and moral perspectives on gam-
bling. Armed with Butler, I argued that the “harm principle” is a principle of 
fundamental justice, with the principle requiring that Parliament have a “rea-
soned apprehension” of harm before it could enact constitutionally sound 
criminal offences. Ultimately, the constitutional challenge to the gambling 
provisions failed on the basis that the Court of Appeal found that, despite the 
proliferation of provincial gambling ventures, there still remained some degree 
of harm warranting resort to the criminal law. The Court provided no comment 
relating to whether it considered the harm principle to be a principle of funda-
mental justice. 
To what extent can the “harm principle” be considered a principle of funda-
mental justice? When does a principle become a “basic tenet” of criminal jus-
tice policy? These questions do not have simple answers, but presumably the 
fundamental nature of a principle can be demonstrated by showing that it is 
consistent with other accepted principles of justice. A vibrant section 7 right 
against self-incrimination was largely constructed by the Court on the basis of a 
synthesis of interconnected principles of common law and constitutional law. It 
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can be seen that support for the “harm principle” can be found in the existing 
structure of constitutional adjudication. 
First, one need only turn to constitutional review under the Constitution Act, 
186771 to see that courts are constitutionally mandated to review legislative 
determinations of harm. With respect to the criminal law power under section 
91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the following summary of the scope of 
this power has been repeatedly adopted by the Court: 
The traditional root of discussions in this field is found in Russell v. The Queen 
[(1882), 7 App. Cas. 829 (P.C.)], where Sir Montague E. Smith said at p. 839: 
Laws . . . designed for the promotion of public order, safety or morals 
and which subject those who contravene them to criminal procedure and 
punishment, belong to the subject of public wrongs rather than to that of 
civil rights . . . and have direct relation to the criminal law. 
That there are limits to the extent of the criminal authority is obvious and these 
limits were pointed out by this Court in The Reference as to the Validity of Section 
5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act (Margarine Reference), [[1949] S.C.R. 1, aff’d 
[1951] A.C. 179], where Rand J. looked to the object of the statute to find whether 
or not it related to the traditional field of criminal law, namely public peace, order, 
security, health and morality. In that case, the Court found that the object of the 
statute was economic: . . . 
The test is one of substance, not form, and excludes from criminal jurisdiction leg-
islative activity not having the prescribed characteristics of criminal law: 
A crime is an act which the law, with appropriate penal sanctions, for-
bids; but as prohibitions are not enacted in a vacuum, we can properly 
look for some evil or injurious or undesirable effect upon the public 
against which the law is directed. That effect may be in relation to social, 
economic or political interests; and the legislature has had in mind to 
suppress the evil or the safeguard the interest threatened.” [Reference re 
Validity of s. 5(a) of Dairy Industry Act (Canada), (Margarine Case), 
[1949] S.C.R. 1, at 49, [1949] 1 D.L.R. 433, at 472-3 (R. and J.), affirmed 
(sub nom. Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Quebec (Attorney Gen-
eral)) [1950] 4 D.L.R. 689 (P.C.).] [Emphasis added.]72 
The Margarine Case73 provided a perfect example of the constitutional 
proposition that “there are limits to the extent of criminal authority”. In that 
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case the Supreme Court invalidated a criminal prohibition on the sale of marga-
rine on the basis that the original legislative assumption of harm (i.e., that 
margarine was injurious to health) was no longer valid in light of new scientific 
evidence, and in light of the fact that the government itself imported and sold 
margarine during the war. Originally, the law conformed to the harm principle, 
but with the passage of time this “reasoned apprehension of harm” was lacking. 
This 1949 decision provides significant support for the elevation of the “harm 
principle” into a principle of fundamental justice. 
The spirit of the Margarine Case lives on in contemporary constitutional ad-
judication. Whether a court is balancing interests under section 7 or section 1, 
constitutional review will require a court to assess the objectives underlying an 
impugned law. In balancing competing interests in Rodriguez, the Court noted: 
“Where the deprivation of the right in question does little or nothing to enhance 
the state’s interest (whatever that may be), it seems to me that a breach of fun-
damental justice will be made out, as the individual’s rights will have been 
deprived for no valid purpose.”74 
Clearly, this question is just a restatement of the harm principle. In the con-
text of criminal law, asserting that a provision “does little or nothing to enhance 
the state’s interest” is just another way of saying that the law does not protect 
society from an apprehended harm. The Court is reflecting on the evil of allow-
ing arbitrary laws to operate, and the prohibition on arbitrariness is a direction 
that Parliament must be combating a genuine social ill before being constitu-
tionally empowered to enact criminal law. The section 7 vagueness doctrine is 
also part and parcel of the prohibition on arbitrary law. Vagueness is con-
demned because it violates the rule of law, and the underlying purpose of 
Dicey’s rule of law was to prevent arbitrary rule by lawmakers. A vague law is 
arbitrary because it cannot guide citizens, and a law is equally arbitrary if it 
serves no constructive purpose despite being crystal-clear in its prescriptions. 
The harm principle is also consistent with the liberal political theory which 
has animated the legislative practices of most of the western world in this past 
century. Liberal political theory has constructed liberty-limiting principles to 
define the legitimate occasions for legislative proscription of conduct. Liberal 
legality advocates the harm principle — that is, that legislative intervention can 
only be justified on the basis of preventing harm. Harm is an elusive concept. It 
is naive to believe that Mill’s dichotomy of self-regarding versus other-
regarding harm75 is an acceptable starting point. Harm may be defined deon-
tologically as conduct impairing welfare interests or foundational interests that 
                                                                                                                                                              
74
 Supra, note 21, at 594. 
75
 On Liberty, McCallum (ed.) (1946). 
148  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
are not contingent upon social recognition.76 Alternatively, harm may be de-
fined in a utilitarian fashion as impairment of legally recognized interests that 
find recognition on the basis of social utility.77 Under either formulation there 
have been four basic groups of harms that have been historically recognized: 1) 
violation of interest in retaining or maintaining what one is entitled to have 
(i.e., life, liberty, security, and property); 2) offences to sensibility; 3) impair-
ment of collective welfare; 4) violation of some governmental interest.78 It 
matters not whether we adopt Mill’s conception of the harm principle or 
whether we expand his notion of liberal legality to encompass legal paternal-
ism, legal moralism, or perfectionism. Under any conception it is still necessary 
for the legislature to identify some discrete harm which can justify the use of 
state coercion. 
Finally, it can be seen that the harm principle is consistent with official 
statements of Canadian criminal justice policy for the past 50 years. Here are 
three important examples. In 1969, the Report of the Canadian Committee on 
Corrections (Ouimet Report) noted: 
The Committee adopts the following criteria as properly indicating the scope of 
criminal law: 
1.  No act should be criminally proscribed unless its incidence, actual or po-
tential, is substantially damaging to society. 
2.  No act should be criminally prohibited where its incidence may ade-
quately be controlled by social forces other than the criminal process. 
Public opinion may be enough to curtail certain kinds of behaviour. Other 
kinds of behaviour may be more appropriately dealt with by non-criminal 
legal processes, e.g. by legislation relating to mental health or social and 
economic condition. 
3.  No law should give rise to social or personal damage greater than that it 
was designed to prevent.79 
Further, in 1976 the Law Reform Commission advocated the use of restraint 
in criminal law, stating that: 
If criminal law’s function is to re-affirm fundamental values, then it must concern 
itself with “real crimes” only and not with the plethora of “regulatory offences” 
found throughout our laws. Our Criminal Code should contain only such acts as are 
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not only punishable but also wrong — acts contravening fundamental values. All 
other offences must remain outside the Code . . . To count as a real crime an act 
must be morally wrong. But this, as we said earlier, is but a necessary condition 
and not a sufficient one. Not all wrongful acts should qualify as real crimes. The 
real criminal law should be confined to wrongful acts seriously threatening and in-
fringing fundamental social values. These values fall into two kinds. Some are es-
sential generally to the very existence of society. Some are essential to the 
existence of our own particular society as it is.80 
Finally, the Government of Canada in 1982 published a policy statement 
with respect to the purposes and principles of the criminal law, stating that: 
The basic theme, however, is important, in stressing that the criminal law ought to 
be reserved for reacting to conduct that is seriously harmful. The harm may be 
caused or threatened to the physical safety or integrity of individuals, or through in-
terference with their property. It may be caused or threatened to the collective 
safety or integrity of society through the infliction of direct damage or the under-
mining of what the Law Reform Commission terms fundamental or essential values 
— those values or interests necessary for social life to be carried on, or for the 
maintenance of the kind of society cherished by Canadians. Since many acts may 
be “harmful”, and since society has many other means for controlling or responding 
to conduct, criminal law should be used only when the harm caused or threatened is 
serious, and when the other, less coercive or less intrusive means do not work or 
are inappropriate.81 
In the Introduction, I mentioned that subsequent to having brought constitu-
tional challenges to the gambling provisions, I discovered a “crack in the wall” 
which provided the fuel for continuing the battle to elevate the harm principle 
into a principle of fundamental justice. In 1997, the Nova Scotia Court of Ap-
peal dismissed a challenge to another consensual crime (incest among adults). 
In the course of dismissing the challenge, the Court stated: 
The analysis of these arguments must be undertaken with the recognition that 
the appellants have the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that their 
fundamental rights are violated by the law in question. In that respect, I note that 
the appellants have not presented any evidence that indicates that incest between 
consenting adults is permitted by the law of any other civilized nation, nor have 
they filed any articles or learned publications, law reform commission papers or 
other material that supports their position that “recreational” sexual activity with 
blood relations should be legalized and constitutionally protected.82  
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Based upon this passage, it became apparent to me that the prohibition on 
marijuana possession would be the best vehicle for advancing the harm princi-
ple as a constitutional tool for decriminalizing consensual crimes. Unlike in-
cest, with respect to marijuana consumption there is a vast body of academic 
literature calling out for decriminalization, many other civilized nations have 
changed their prohibitory policies with respect to marijuana possession, and 
virtually every Commission of Inquiry, including the 1972 Canadian LeDain 
Commission, has called for the decriminalization of marijuana possession.83 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there is considerable public support for law re-
form in this area. Perhaps the incest, obscenity, prostitution and gambling 
provisions are supported by a “reasoned apprehension of harm”, but with re-
spect to marijuana, there is wide array of legislative facts calling into question 
the legitimacy of the prohibition. 
The “harm principle” challenge to the prohibition on marijuana possession 
initiated in the Clay case84 offence was predicated on the introduction of an 
extensive body of expert evidence from the fields of history, sociology, psy-
chiatry, criminology, pharmacology and medicine. Ultimately, the challenge 
was dismissed primarily on the basis that the question of harm is primarily a 
political question best left to the policy determinations of a legislature. The trial 
judge did not conclude that the harm principle was a principle of fundamental 
justice; however, in order to facilitate further judicial review in appellate courts, 
the trial judge was requested to make findings of fact with respect to the issue 
of harm, and the following findings were made: 
1.  Consumption of marijuana is relatively harmless compared to the so-called 
hard drugs and including tobacco and alcohol; 
2.  There exists no hard evidence demonstrating any irreversible organic or 
mental damage from the consumption of marijuana; 
3.  That cannabis does cause alteration of mental functions and as such, it 
would not be prudent to drive a car while intoxicated; 
4.  There is no hard evidence that cannabis consumption induces psychoses; 
5.  Cannabis is not an addictive substance; 
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6.  Marijuana is not criminogenic in that there is no evidence of a causal rela-
tionship between cannabis use and criminality; 
7.  That the consumption of marijuana probably does not lead to “hard drug” 
use for the vast majority of marijuana consumers, although there appears to 
be a statistical relationship between the use of marijuana and a variety of 
other psychoactive drugs; 
8.  Marijuana does not make people more aggressive or violent; 
9.  There have been no recorded deaths from the consumption of marijuana; 
10.  There is no evidence that marijuana causes amotivational syndrome; 
11.  Less than 1% of marijuana consumers are daily users; 
12.  Consumption in so-called “de-criminalized states” does not increase out of 
proportion to states where there is no de-criminalization. 
13.  Health related costs of cannabis use are negligible when compared to the 
costs attributable to tobacco and alcohol consumption.85 
Subsequent to the Clay case, a court in British Columbia was faced with a 
virtually identical record of legislative facts, and the court reached virtually 
identical findings of fact. The British Columbia court also provided an over-
view of the social and economic harms triggered by the prohibition itself: 
1.  Countless Canadians, mostly adolescents and young adults, are being prose-
cuted in the “criminal” courts, subjected to the threat of (if not actual) im-
prisonment, and branded with criminal records for engaging in an activity 
that is remarkably benign (estimates suggest that over 600,000 Canadians 
now have criminal records for cannabis related offences); meanwhile others 
are free to consume society’s drugs of choice, alcohol and tobacco, even 
though these drugs are known killers; 
2.  Disrespect for the law by upwards of one million persons who are prepared 
to engage in the activity, notwithstanding the legal prohibition; 
3.  Distrust, by users of health and educational authorities who, in the past, 
have promoted false and exaggerated allegations about marijuana; the risk 
is that marijuana users, especially the young, will no longer listen, even to 
the truth; 
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4.  Lack of open communication between young persons and their elders about 
their use of the drug or any problems they are experiencing with it, given 
that it is illegal; 
5.  The risk that our young people will be associating with actual criminals and 
hard drug users who are the primary suppliers of the drug; 
6.  The lack of governmental control over the quality of the drug on the market, 
given that it is only available on the black-market; 
7.  The creation of a lawless sub-culture whose only reason for being is to 
grow, import and distribute a drug which is not available through lawful 
means; 
8.  The enormous financial costs associated with enforcement of the law; and 
9.  The inability to engage in meaningful research into the properties, effects 
and dangers of the drug, because possession of the drug is unlawful.86 
Both cases were appealed, and both the Ontario and British Columbia Courts 
of Appeal concluded that the harm principle is a principle of fundamental jus-
tice. A substantive principle of justice was clearly recognized. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal adopted the following statement made by the B.C. Court of 
Appeal: 
I conclude that on the basis of all of these sources — common law, Law Reform 
Commissions, the federalism cases, Charter litigation — that the “harm principle” 
is indeed a principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of s. 7. It is a legal 
principle and it is concise. Moreover, there is a consensus among reasonable people 
that it is vital to our system of justice. Indeed, I think that it is common sense that 
you do not go to jail unless there is a potential that your activities will cause harm 
to others. 
. . . 
[T]he proper way of characterizing the “harm principle” in the context of the 
Charter is to determine whether the prohibited activities hold a “reasoned appre-
hension of harm” to other individuals or society . . . The degree of harm must be 
neither insignificant nor trivial.87 
The Supreme Court of Canada will hear argument in the marijuana cases in 
the fall of 2002, and the Court will be required to decide whether 1) the harm 
principle is a principle of fundamental justice; 2) if it is, is conformity with the 
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principle satisfied by a reasonable apprehension of a trivial level of harm, or by 
a reasonable apprehension of a significant or substantial level of harm? and 3) 
do the legislative facts demonstrate that the prohibition on marijuana posses-
sion violates this principle, however defined? The answers to these questions 
will serve as further food for thought with respect to the larger question posed 
at the outset of this paper: has the Charter truly had a significant impact on the 
balance of political power in this country? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In 1995, I made the following claim: 
The Charter supports a vision of a lawmaking partnership between the judiciary 
and the legislature. Of course, the “legislature will be the dominant architect”, but, 
as with most joint ventures, “one partner cannot be left guessing about what the 
other is doing and why”. To ensure that a proper dialogue between the judiciary 
and Parliament is created, the Court must speak clearly and act fearlessly. It must 
not, by clever subterfuge, avoid the opportunities to create guidelines . . . [I]f the 
Court avoids taking bold steps, chances are that the dialogue will never get off the 
ground . . .88 
Since this passage was written, the dialogue between courts and legislatures 
has not necessarily developed in a healthy manner. With respect to the issue of 
production of sensitive records in the possession of third parties, the Court 
articulated a detailed framework only to have Parliament enact legislation 
similar in spirit but different in application.89 With respect to the defence of 
extreme intoxication, Parliament effectively overruled the judicial creation of 
this defence.90 Both decisions of the Court were premised upon constitutional 
principles, and yet this did not prevent the Legislature from adopting their own 
view with respect to the demands of the Constitution. If anything, this is an 
uncomfortable dialogue because the traditional understanding of constitutional 
adjudication is that the judicial branch of government has exclusive authority 
over the interpretation and application of constitutional norms. With the Legis-
lature seemingly ignoring the constitutional underpinnings of two Court deci-
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sions, one might wonder if the Court will fall prey to the maxim: “once bitten, 
twice shy”. The recent marijuana challenges will put the Court back in the 
political hot seat, and this case will have a direct impact upon the building of a 
judicial-legislative dialogue.  
There is little doubt that the Charter has shifted the balance of political 
power in this country, but the proper understanding of the role and function of 
judicial review in this new order still remains fraught with some uncertainty. 
The most pronounced shift in power with respect to criminal justice policy 
would occur if the courts developed substantive principles of fundamental 
justice which prevent Parliament from enacting criminal prohibitions which do 
not serve the public interest. This type of development would thrust the Court 
directly into a quasi-legislative role. It is not clear whether the Court is willing 
to assume this responsibility. Professor Alexander Bickel aptly described the 
ideal judicial function in a shifting political framework in the following terms: 
The search must be for a function which might (indeed, must) involve the making 
of policy; yet which differs from the legislative and executive function; which is 
peculiarly suited to the capabilities of the courts; which will not be so exercised as 
to be acceptable in a society that generally shares Judge Learned Hand’s satisfac-
tion in a “sense of common venture”; which will be effective when needed; and 
whose discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other departments’ 
performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own responsibil-
ity.91 
The ideal may be easily stated, but after 20 years of the Charter it still re-
mains too early to determine if we have realized the ideal, or only idealized the 
real.  
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 The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (1962), at 158. 
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